Debating God
Can God be said to take risks if he knows everything?
Tuesday, October 9th, 20072:53 pm
It may seem fairly obvious that an all-knowing God could not be said to take any risks. A risk seems to necessitate that something is unknown to the risk-taker. Betting money on a horse, for example, is considered risky because the gambler does not know which horse will win. If the gambler were omniscient, then […]
God and Time Part VI: The Argument From Divine Omniscience
Monday, March 12th, 20075:57 pm
Another argument against divine timelessness is that God could not be completely omniscient were God not in time. Pike argues that some true statements describe one’s temporal position (e.g. “Today is the 10th of December”), and so could not be known by a timeless being (95). Sally knows that yesterday she ate a banana. Since […]
God and Time Part V: The Argument From God’s Real Relation to The World
Saturday, March 10th, 200711:44 pm
Perhaps a more promising argument against divine timelessness is the argument from God’s real relation to the temporal world. Craig formulates such an argument:
Either God existed prior to creation or He did not. Suppose He did. In that case, God is temporal, not timeless, since to exist prior to some event is to be in […]
God and Time Part V: The Argument From Divine Personhood
Tuesday, January 30th, 200711:45 am
There are many who would say that there is good reason to think that divine timelessness is false. One argument attempts to show that divine timelessness is incompatible with divine personhood.[i] Robert Coburn has argued that there are certain intellectual capacities which are required for personhood but which God could not have were he not […]
God and Time Part IV: The Argument From The Incompleteness of Temporal Life
Wednesday, January 24th, 20074:18 pm
Perhaps the best argument for divine timelessness is that God’s life would not be complete if God were in time. Paul Helm makes this argument in “Divine Timeless Eternity:”
Let us grant that a God in time may perfectly recall every detail of the past, as (we may suppose) we on occasion recall details of our […]