What we need in America
By Jonathan Bryan | February 6, 2008
What we really need in America today is a decent propaganda machine. Or, if we’re going to have to tolerate all these kids and their anti-war rallies, it should at least be accompanied by some good original music like there was during Viet Nam.
Topics: Debating Politics | 1 Comment »
By Jonathan Bryan | December 15, 2007
We had a pillow fight and I broke a Christmas ornament.
Topics: Debating White Monkees | 3 Comments »
Should Extra-Biblical Knowledge Inform our Interpretation of Scripture?
By Jonathan Bryan | November 30, 2007
In an exciting sermon, John Wesley espoused the following impassioned complaint against the usual Calvinistic interpretation of certain passages of Scripture:
But you say you will prove it [unconditional election] by scripture. Hold! What will you prove by Scripture? That God is worse than the devil? It cannot be. Whatever that Scripture proves, it never proved this; whatever its true meaning be. This cannot be its true meaning. Do you ask, “What is its true meaning then?” If I say, “I know not,” you have gained nothing; for there are many scriptures the true sense whereof neither you nor I shall know till death is swallowed up in victory. But this I know, better it were to say it had no sense, than to say it had such a sense as this. It cannot mean, whatever it mean besides, that the God of truth is a liar. Let it mean what it will, it cannot mean that the Judge of all the world is unjust. No scripture can mean that God is not love, or that his mercy is not over all his works; that is, whatever it prove beside, no scripture can prove predestination.
Scripture, according to Wesley, cannot prove unconditional election (by “predestination,” Wesley is specifically referring to the Calvinist understanding of predestination) because this would be to prove God to be other than we know him to be.
To many, Wesley’s argument would seem entirely misguided. Prior to this impassioned part of his sermon, Wesley makes some arguments which he believes show that the doctrine of unconditional election does indeed imply that God is not love, that God is not just, and so forth. Regardless of how convincing (or unconvincing) these arguments may be, the problem for many is that Wesley’s understanding of what scripture teaches on election is shaped by what he has already reasoned about the implications of predestination on God’s love, justice, and so on. But shouldn’t his understanding of what the Bible teaches on election be shaped entirely about what the Bible actually teaches on election, and not on philosophical arguments? Shouldn’t we let our theology be shaped by the Bible, rather than let our Bible be shaped by our theology?
The answer to this question is not as easy as it looks. In order to discern what the Bible says, it is obvious that a certain set of principles must be assumed. We cannot interpret the Bible without knowing how to interpret the Bible, and the Bible itself does not give us the general principles (I am thinking of such basic hermeneutical principles as “pay attention to context,” and basic logical principles like the law of non-contradiction) that we need in order to interpret the Bible. And even if the Bible did give us those principles in certain passages, how would we interpret those passages without already assuming the basic principles? It seems obvious, then, that at a very basic level our interpretation of Scripture is shaped by outside sources, since we cannot even attempt to interpret Scripture without assuming some basic principles which are not learned from Scripture. This is, however, a good deal away from saying that what we can reason about God and man can shape our understanding of the Bible. The level with which extra biblical knowledge must shape our understanding of the Bible is at such a basic level that it is the sort of thing which men assume without even realizing it.
Once we admit, however, that extra-biblical knowledge does inform our interpretation of the Bible, we must accept a simple consequence of this fact: even if the Bible is the ultimate authority in terms of what can be known, it cannot be the sole authority. At the very least, we can gain genuine knowledge of reality not only from scripture but also from other sources. How much we can gain from these other sources is a difficult question, but at the very least an argument from extra-biblical sources about God cannot be dismissed simply because it is “merely” an argument from extra-biblical sources. That is, once we accept reason or experience or some authority other than the Bible as a genuine source of knowledge, we must allow for the possibility that it can tell us something about God.
It has been maintained by many that what extra-biblical sources do tell us about God is, while important, not very much. We may be able to discern through rational thinking that God exists and some things about him, but we can hardly discern that God is triune without the help of special revelation. If this is the case, it is doubtful that reason can tell us anything at all about such subjects as God’s election of certain people to salvation. This seems true if we are speaking of reason which is uninformed by special revelation. But it seems to me that reason which is informed by special revelation can tell us a great deal about God which could not be known from what scripture by itself specifically tells us. That is, in addition to what can be known by reason alone and what can be known by what the Bible tells us (which is itself informed by reason at a basic level), there is also what can be known by reason which is informed by Scripture. That is, we can reason about what scripture tells us in order to gain knowledge beyond what scripture directly tells us. In addition, what scripture tells us should inform how we reason. That is, general and special revelation can work together rather than as separate methods of knowing.
If this is accepted, some difficult epistemological questions immediately arise. What if what the Bible directly tells us contradicts the knowledge we have gained through reason (or from reasoning about scripture)? Do we conclude that our reasoning must be incorrect or that our interpretation of the scripture which contradicts our reasoning is incorrect? It seems that we have two equally powerful arguments for both options. We may describe them as follows.
Argument 1:
1. According to a line of reasoning, X is true.
2. According to an interpretation of a Biblical passage, X is not true.
3. The line of reasoning is correct.
Therefore, the interpretation of the passage is incorrect.
Argument 2:
1. According to a line of reasoning, X is true.
2. According to an interpretation of a Biblical passage, X is not true.
3. The interpretation of the passage is correct.
Therefore, the line of reasoning is incorrect.
Both arguments seem equally valid; to deny this would either be to deny that reason can tell us about reality or to deny that scripture is an authority. The question is how certain we can be of the third premise in either argument. Concerning the third premise in the second argument, it is important to note that determining whether a particular interpretation is correct itself requires a line of reasoning. The problem before us is therefore not so much about scripture verses reason, but about reason verses reason. For, as has been said before, our interpretation of scripture requires reason. And an argument for why a particular passage of scripture is correct certainly requires reason. Now, suppose that the line of reasoning, while fairly convincing, is less convincing than the reasoning which tells us to accept the interpretation of the passage. It seems to me that we must conclude, in this case, that our line of reasoning is somehow incorrect. But supposing we find that the line of reasoning is more convincing than the reasoning which tells us to accept the interpretation of the passage? Here things are a little more difficult. If scripture should be understood to be the ultimate authority, perhaps what it tells us directly should have more weight than what we may gain from reasoning about what scripture tells us. Nevertheless (especially since it must be acknowledged that even our interpretation of scripture involves reasoning) it can at least be said that if it is unclear that the interpretation is correct to begin with, and if the line of reasoning is sufficiently convincing, we are justified in concluding that the interpretation of scripture is incorrect.
Suppose that someone is attempting to decide whether scripture teaches that angelic beings once looked upon the daughters of men with lust and even engaged in intercourse with some of them, resulting in the birth of various giants. Suppose, also, that he finds what Genesis 6 tells him to be rather unclear—it is unclear, perhaps, that the phrase “sons of God” refers to angelic beings. Suppose further that he has clear reasons for believing that it would not be possible for angelic beings to engage in such acts (e.g. perhaps he finds evidence that angels are purely spiritual, and deduces that impregnating human women would be impossible for such beings). It seems to me that, in such a scenario, a person would be epistemologically justified in rejecting the interpretation of scripture which says that there were angelic beings that lusted after the daughters of men and even engaged in intercourse with some of them, resulting in the birth of various giants. The reason he would be justified is not because an alternative interpretation is clearly correct, but because an alternate interpretation better coincides with what he has good reason to believe about angels.
I believe that this approach to scripture is commonsensical and is even commonly used by those who may wish to make objection against it. For example, any Christian theologian who reads in Hebrews that God says to Jesus “You are my Son, Today I have begotten You,” knows that this cannot mean that there was an actual time (before “today”) when the Son was not. And he knows this without even looking at the context of the passage. He knows this because he knows that such a thing would be at odds with what he knows about Jesus from other passages of scripture, what he has already reasoned about those scriptures, and from a general tradition which tells him that Jesus does not have a beginning. And he knows that if Hebrews actually did mean that there was some time when the Son of God was not, then Hebrews would be heretical. But since Hebrews, the theologian will assume, is not heretical, it follows that Hebrews does not actually mean that Jesus had a beginning. Now, I realize that there are probably good hermeneutical reasons to believe that Hebrews does not mean that Jesus had a beginning. My point is that the theologian can and does reject this interpretation regardless of this, and he is right in doing so.
I conclude that we cannot object to a line of argument like that of Wesley’s simply because it is more philosophical than hermeneutical. Wesley thinks it is right to reject the Calvinistic interpretation of scripture, not because there is an alternative interpretation which better suits those particular texts, but because accepting the Calvinist interpretation makes God (in his words) “worse than the devil.” I see no reason to reject his method. The question is simply whether the Calvinistic understanding of predestination does indeed imply some unreasonable things about God. If we find convincing reasons to believe that it does, we cannot, in my view, do anything but agree with Wesley in rejection those interpretations of scripture.
Topics: Debating White Monkees | 3 Comments »
By Jonathan Bryan | October 20, 2007
People should be a little more impressed by things like buttons. How else would the two sides of your coat meet?
Topics: Debating White Monkees | 2 Comments »
Can God be said to take risks if he knows everything?
By Jonathan Bryan | October 9, 2007
It may seem fairly obvious that an all-knowing God could not be said to take any risks. A risk seems to necessitate that something is unknown to the risk-taker. Betting money on a horse, for example, is considered risky because the gambler does not know which horse will win. If the gambler were omniscient, then he would know which horse would win and so could not, even if he wanted to, take any kind of risk. Even if he bet on a horse he knew would lose, he would not be taking a risk, but merely throwing away money. I will, however, argue that if God knows the free actions of creatures by way of perceiving them, and knows the free actions of creatures only by way of perceiving them, it is logically possible, in so far as it does not contradict anything else about God, for God to take risks even while knowing all things. My purpose is not to show that God actually did or does take risks, nor is it to argue that this particular understanding of God’s knowledge is correct (or incorrect). All I wish to do here is argue that if we attribute God’s knowledge of free choices to his perceiving those choices, then we may conclude that God’s knowledge of all things does not make it logically impossible for God to take risks.
Suppose God knows that you will freely choose to eat a banana tomorrow. How does God know this? God could know it because he determined that you freely choose to eat a banana tomorrow. This would be just fine if it were possible to determine that something be freely chosen. It is arguable that this is not the case, however, and so this conception of God’s knowledge of free actions may not be a good one. Another way that God could know that you will freely choose to eat a banana tomorrow is by perceiving everything about you today and deducing what you will do tomorrow. This would be just fine if knowledge of freely chosen actions could be deduced in this way. It is arguable that this is not the case, however, and so this conception of God’s knowledge of free actions may not be a good one. Yet another way that God could know that you will freely choose to eat a banana tomorrow is by perceiving the actual eating of the banana. If God is outside of time, then God could see you eating the banana tomorrow as if it were occurring this very instant. If God is not outside of time, I suppose God could still see into the future and observe you eating the banana (much like a fortune teller sees through a crystal ball, except without the crystal ball and the strange attire). Either way, God would know that you freely choose to eat a banana tomorrow in much the same way that you and I can know the free choices of other people. We know that someone is smiling at us, for example, because we see them smiling at us. We do not know that they are smiling at us because we determined them to smile at us, nor do we know that they are smiling at us because we can deduce from everything we know about them and everything we know about the surrounding conditions that they are necessarily smiling at us. We know they are smiling at us because we perceive what they are doing through our senses. God does not have “senses” in the same way we do, of course — God does not have literal eyes or ears by which he literally sees or hears us doing things. But I think it is reasonable to say that God can perceive exactly what we are doing in a far more acute way than humans can with the physical senses.
Let us suppose that God creates world X, in which there are the following: A room with two buttons (A and B), and a person (let’s call him Nate) with free will. Let us also suppose that the happiness of Nate is determined by which button he pushes, and that God wants Nate to be happy. If Nate chooses to push button A, which makes him unhappy, and God perceives Nate pushing button A, then God knows that Nate pushes button A. Now Nate’s pushing button A is dependent on a number of things. World X, first of all, has to exist. In addition, Nate has to exist and Nate has to choose to push button A. God’s knowledge of Nate’s pushing button A, then, is dependent on God creating the world X, on God creating Nate, and on Nate choosing to push button A.
Now, supposing that God did not know which button Nate would push, God could be said to have taken a risk when he created world X. Nate might become happy by pushing button B, which God wants, but Nate might also become unhappy by pushing button A, which is not what God wants. Given, however, that God knows which button that Nate will push (because he perceives Nate pushing the button) we might want to say that God does not take a risk in creating world X, and may thus want to ask why God would create world X if he knew that Nate would push button A and not button B.
I think we would be mistaken, however, in thinking that because God knows which button Nate will push; that it necessarily follows that God would not be taking a risk in creating world X. This is because God’s knowledge of Nate pushing button A is dependent on God perceiving that Nate push button A, and Nate pushing button A is dependent on his existence and the existence of world X. Thus God cannot know that Nate will push button A unless he actually creates world X, and so the reasons for which God creates world X cannot include his knowledge of Nate’s choice to push button A.
Suppose God is deciding whether to create world X. If God looks into the future and perceives Nate choosing to push button A (or if God is outside of time, God simply perceives Nate choosing to push button A), and uses this knowledge to decide to not create world X, then God contradicts himself. For in order for God to know that Nate actually chooses to push button A, God would already have decided to created world X (or if God is outside of time, God would be deciding to create world X). That is, God would be deciding not to create world X on the basis of knowledge which he can only know because he does create world X. It isn’t that God doesn’t know what the actions of Nate will be until Nate takes action. Rather, God does know the actions of Nate from all eternity, but God’s decision to create world X cannot be based on his knowledge of Nate’s actions, because his knowledge of Nate’s actions is itself a result of his creating world X. Thus it seems to me that God takes a risk in creating world X, not because he doesn’t know what Nate’s actions will be, but because he cannot take that knowledge into consideration when creating world X. God would not have that knowledge unless he does create world X, and so the knowledge cannot be a reason for God’s creation. God must have created world X for entirely other reasons than his knowledge of Nate’s actions.
The obvious objection to all this is to say that an omniscient God, while he may not know that Nate does in fact choose button A unless he creates world X, he would still know that Nate would choose button A if world X were created. And he would know this regardless of whether world X were actually created, and so God could take this into consideration when deciding to create world X.
This is a good point, but I’m not sure if this knowledge of what someone would freely choose in a hypothetical circumstance is really knowledge. If actions are freely chosen, and not determined by prior circumstances, then can it ever be true to say that someone would freely do X in circumstance Y? I am not just saying that it would be impossible to know what someone would freely do in a hypothetical situation; I am questioning whether saying what someone would freely do in a particular situation has any real meaning. If we know that someone did in fact choose X in circumstance Y, does it follow that it is true to say that he would choose X in circumstance Y? If you put a free creature in a laboratory and observed what he chooses in a particular situation, you couldn’t conclude that he would do that same thing in the exact same circumstances; otherwise it seems that the choice he makes is not really free.
Topics: Debating God, Debating Knowledge | No Comments »