The body would be all foot?
By Jonathan Bryan | June 8, 2009
Inexplicably, the ole website is back up. Not sure what happened there, but anyway, St Athanasius made an interesting argument (a long time ago) against the universe coming into existence spontaneously or “automatically”:
“In regard to the making of the universe and the creation of all things there have been various opinions, and each person has propounded the theory that suited his own taste. For instance, some say that all things are self-originated and, so to speak, haphazard. The Epicureans are among these; they deny that there is any Mind behind the universe at all. This view is contrary to all the facts of experience, their own existence included. For if all things had come into being in this automatic fashion, instead of being the outcome of Mind, though they existed, they would all be uniform and without distinction. In the universe everything would be sun or moon or whatever it was, and in the human body the whole would be hand or eye or foot. But in point of fact the sun and the moon and the earth are all different things, and even within the human body there are different members, such as foot and hand and head. This distinction of things argues not of spontaneous generation but a prevenient Cause; and from that Cause we can apprehend God, the designer and maker of all.” - From “On the Incarnation”
So the argument is simply:
1. If the universe came about spontaneously, there would be no distinctions among things. (S>~D)
2. But there are distinctions among things. (D)
3. Therefore, it is not the case that the universe came about spontaneously (~S from 1,2 Modus hocus pocus tonens).
The argument, being perfectly valid, needs only its premises to be defended. The second premise is obviously true. As Athanasius points out, there are differences between the hand and foot, making them distinct. The first premise, however, is rather difficult. Why should we think it true that if it were the case that the universe came about spontaneously, that there would be no distinctions among things? Well, one way to argue for the first premise is to first argue that the universe did not come about spontaneously. As everyone knows who has dutifully done their truth tables in logic class, if both sides of the conditional are false, the proposition as a whole is true (for example, “If that’s not a hamster, then my name isn’t Captain Barbarian!” is true so long as it is false that that’s not a hamster, and false that my name isn’t Captain Barbarian.) So all we need is another good argument that the universe did not come about spontaneously (say, the Cosmological argument, for example) to argue for the truth of premise one, and St. Athanasius’ argument will work! Problem solved.
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What we need in America
By Jonathan Bryan | February 6, 2008
What we really need in America today is a decent propaganda machine. Or, if we’re going to have to tolerate all these kids and their anti-war rallies, it should at least be accompanied by some good original music like there was during Viet Nam.
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By Jonathan Bryan | December 15, 2007
We had a pillow fight and I broke a Christmas ornament.
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Should Extra-Biblical Knowledge Inform our Interpretation of Scripture?
By Jonathan Bryan | November 30, 2007
In an exciting sermon, John Wesley espoused the following impassioned complaint against the usual Calvinistic interpretation of certain passages of Scripture:
But you say you will prove it [unconditional election] by scripture. Hold! What will you prove by Scripture? That God is worse than the devil? It cannot be. Whatever that Scripture proves, it never proved this; whatever its true meaning be. This cannot be its true meaning. Do you ask, “What is its true meaning then?” If I say, “I know not,” you have gained nothing; for there are many scriptures the true sense whereof neither you nor I shall know till death is swallowed up in victory. But this I know, better it were to say it had no sense, than to say it had such a sense as this. It cannot mean, whatever it mean besides, that the God of truth is a liar. Let it mean what it will, it cannot mean that the Judge of all the world is unjust. No scripture can mean that God is not love, or that his mercy is not over all his works; that is, whatever it prove beside, no scripture can prove predestination.
Scripture, according to Wesley, cannot prove unconditional election (by “predestination,” Wesley is specifically referring to the Calvinist understanding of predestination) because this would be to prove God to be other than we know him to be.
To many, Wesley’s argument would seem entirely misguided. Prior to this impassioned part of his sermon, Wesley makes some arguments which he believes show that the doctrine of unconditional election does indeed imply that God is not love, that God is not just, and so forth. Regardless of how convincing (or unconvincing) these arguments may be, the problem for many is that Wesley’s understanding of what scripture teaches on election is shaped by what he has already reasoned about the implications of predestination on God’s love, justice, and so on. But shouldn’t his understanding of what the Bible teaches on election be shaped entirely about what the Bible actually teaches on election, and not on philosophical arguments? Shouldn’t we let our theology be shaped by the Bible, rather than let our Bible be shaped by our theology?
The answer to this question is not as easy as it looks. In order to discern what the Bible says, it is obvious that a certain set of principles must be assumed. We cannot interpret the Bible without knowing how to interpret the Bible, and the Bible itself does not give us the general principles (I am thinking of such basic hermeneutical principles as “pay attention to context,” and basic logical principles like the law of non-contradiction) that we need in order to interpret the Bible. And even if the Bible did give us those principles in certain passages, how would we interpret those passages without already assuming the basic principles? It seems obvious, then, that at a very basic level our interpretation of Scripture is shaped by outside sources, since we cannot even attempt to interpret Scripture without assuming some basic principles which are not learned from Scripture. This is, however, a good deal away from saying that what we can reason about God and man can shape our understanding of the Bible. The level with which extra biblical knowledge must shape our understanding of the Bible is at such a basic level that it is the sort of thing which men assume without even realizing it.
Once we admit, however, that extra-biblical knowledge does inform our interpretation of the Bible, we must accept a simple consequence of this fact: even if the Bible is the ultimate authority in terms of what can be known, it cannot be the sole authority. At the very least, we can gain genuine knowledge of reality not only from scripture but also from other sources. How much we can gain from these other sources is a difficult question, but at the very least an argument from extra-biblical sources about God cannot be dismissed simply because it is “merely” an argument from extra-biblical sources. That is, once we accept reason or experience or some authority other than the Bible as a genuine source of knowledge, we must allow for the possibility that it can tell us something about God.
It has been maintained by many that what extra-biblical sources do tell us about God is, while important, not very much. We may be able to discern through rational thinking that God exists and some things about him, but we can hardly discern that God is triune without the help of special revelation. If this is the case, it is doubtful that reason can tell us anything at all about such subjects as God’s election of certain people to salvation. This seems true if we are speaking of reason which is uninformed by special revelation. But it seems to me that reason which is informed by special revelation can tell us a great deal about God which could not be known from what scripture by itself specifically tells us. That is, in addition to what can be known by reason alone and what can be known by what the Bible tells us (which is itself informed by reason at a basic level), there is also what can be known by reason which is informed by Scripture. That is, we can reason about what scripture tells us in order to gain knowledge beyond what scripture directly tells us. In addition, what scripture tells us should inform how we reason. That is, general and special revelation can work together rather than as separate methods of knowing.
If this is accepted, some difficult epistemological questions immediately arise. What if what the Bible directly tells us contradicts the knowledge we have gained through reason (or from reasoning about scripture)? Do we conclude that our reasoning must be incorrect or that our interpretation of the scripture which contradicts our reasoning is incorrect? It seems that we have two equally powerful arguments for both options. We may describe them as follows.
Argument 1:
1. According to a line of reasoning, X is true.
2. According to an interpretation of a Biblical passage, X is not true.
3. The line of reasoning is correct.
Therefore, the interpretation of the passage is incorrect.
Argument 2:
1. According to a line of reasoning, X is true.
2. According to an interpretation of a Biblical passage, X is not true.
3. The interpretation of the passage is correct.
Therefore, the line of reasoning is incorrect.
Both arguments seem equally valid; to deny this would either be to deny that reason can tell us about reality or to deny that scripture is an authority. The question is how certain we can be of the third premise in either argument. Concerning the third premise in the second argument, it is important to note that determining whether a particular interpretation is correct itself requires a line of reasoning. The problem before us is therefore not so much about scripture verses reason, but about reason verses reason. For, as has been said before, our interpretation of scripture requires reason. And an argument for why a particular passage of scripture is correct certainly requires reason. Now, suppose that the line of reasoning, while fairly convincing, is less convincing than the reasoning which tells us to accept the interpretation of the passage. It seems to me that we must conclude, in this case, that our line of reasoning is somehow incorrect. But supposing we find that the line of reasoning is more convincing than the reasoning which tells us to accept the interpretation of the passage? Here things are a little more difficult. If scripture should be understood to be the ultimate authority, perhaps what it tells us directly should have more weight than what we may gain from reasoning about what scripture tells us. Nevertheless (especially since it must be acknowledged that even our interpretation of scripture involves reasoning) it can at least be said that if it is unclear that the interpretation is correct to begin with, and if the line of reasoning is sufficiently convincing, we are justified in concluding that the interpretation of scripture is incorrect.
Suppose that someone is attempting to decide whether scripture teaches that angelic beings once looked upon the daughters of men with lust and even engaged in intercourse with some of them, resulting in the birth of various giants. Suppose, also, that he finds what Genesis 6 tells him to be rather unclear—it is unclear, perhaps, that the phrase “sons of God” refers to angelic beings. Suppose further that he has clear reasons for believing that it would not be possible for angelic beings to engage in such acts (e.g. perhaps he finds evidence that angels are purely spiritual, and deduces that impregnating human women would be impossible for such beings). It seems to me that, in such a scenario, a person would be epistemologically justified in rejecting the interpretation of scripture which says that there were angelic beings that lusted after the daughters of men and even engaged in intercourse with some of them, resulting in the birth of various giants. The reason he would be justified is not because an alternative interpretation is clearly correct, but because an alternate interpretation better coincides with what he has good reason to believe about angels.
I believe that this approach to scripture is commonsensical and is even commonly used by those who may wish to make objection against it. For example, any Christian theologian who reads in Hebrews that God says to Jesus “You are my Son, Today I have begotten You,” knows that this cannot mean that there was an actual time (before “today”) when the Son was not. And he knows this without even looking at the context of the passage. He knows this because he knows that such a thing would be at odds with what he knows about Jesus from other passages of scripture, what he has already reasoned about those scriptures, and from a general tradition which tells him that Jesus does not have a beginning. And he knows that if Hebrews actually did mean that there was some time when the Son of God was not, then Hebrews would be heretical. But since Hebrews, the theologian will assume, is not heretical, it follows that Hebrews does not actually mean that Jesus had a beginning. Now, I realize that there are probably good hermeneutical reasons to believe that Hebrews does not mean that Jesus had a beginning. My point is that the theologian can and does reject this interpretation regardless of this, and he is right in doing so.
I conclude that we cannot object to a line of argument like that of Wesley’s simply because it is more philosophical than hermeneutical. Wesley thinks it is right to reject the Calvinistic interpretation of scripture, not because there is an alternative interpretation which better suits those particular texts, but because accepting the Calvinist interpretation makes God (in his words) “worse than the devil.” I see no reason to reject his method. The question is simply whether the Calvinistic understanding of predestination does indeed imply some unreasonable things about God. If we find convincing reasons to believe that it does, we cannot, in my view, do anything but agree with Wesley in rejection those interpretations of scripture.
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By Jonathan Bryan | October 20, 2007
People should be a little more impressed by things like buttons. How else would the two sides of your coat meet?
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